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Abstract
As the world trends towards a multipolar construct, it is imperative the United States adapt its approach to international relations and its use of the military instrument of national power. It must do so to reverse its outward focus, reform its reputation within the international community, and empower its partners as it slowly moves towards being a pole vice being the pole. This paper analyzes the relative decline debate and compares and contrasts the concepts of deep engagement and restraint. It contextualizes the problem by highlighting the extant forces that will compel Washington to favor the latter over the former and it recommends fundamental foreign policy principles and associated restraint options that will help slow down America's economic decline and preserve its power and influence. In the future, Washington will be compelled to exercise a degree of restraint so that it can focus on the domestic economy, satisfy a war-wary electorate, correct the folly of global democratization, and sequester the costs of nation-building. With a restrained foreign policy, the United States must define its national interests more narrowly, reduce partner dependence on the American security umbrella, and empower coalition partners in future military operations by treating them as "mutually indispensable." If the United States does not seriously reexamine its foreign policy "first principles," relative decline will wax, and influence will wane. America must seize its opportunity for a course correction now.
The idea of the future being different from the present is so repugnant to our conventional modes of thought and behavior that we, most of us, offer a great resistance to acting on it in practice. 1 John Maynard Keynes, a world-renowned economist, delivered the above statement to the Eugenics Society nearly 80 years ago describing a psychological phenomenon that still permeates current macroeconomic and foreign policy discourse. In particular, there has been "a great resistance," as Keynes puts it, among academic and foreign policy elites to recognize and "act on" the changes in the international order that have occurred since the end of the Cold War.
The central debate continues to be whether the world is trending towards a multipolar construct and the complementary, but related, debate relates to what foreign policy principles should be practiced in such an international system.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many argued a multipolar world would quickly emerge, but instead, the United States transitioned through what Charles Krauthammer termed the "unipolar moment" -it stood alone at the apex of the global hierarchy and has remained there since. 2 For the United States, unipolarity is a blessing and a curse at the same time; it provides Washington with the strategic flexibility to implement foreign policies ranging from pseudoisolationist to deep engagement with rapid transitions from one to the other, but it also reinforces a hegemonic hubris which distorts America's perception of the very real "rise of the rest." 3 This paper will show that the future will be different from the present and thus it is imperative for the United States to adapt its approach to international relations and its use of the military instrument of national power. It must do so to reverse its outward focus, reform its reputation within the international community, and empower its partners as it slowly moves towards being a pole vice being the pole.
This paper is divided into three main parts: the first part will lay the foundation by analyzing the "declinist" debate and compare and contrast the concepts of deep engagement and restraint; the second part will contextualize the problem by highlighting the extant forces that will compel Washington to favor restraint over engagement; and the final part will recommend fundamental foreign policy principles and associated restraint options that, if adopted, will slow down America's economic decline and preserve, to the maximum extent possible, its power and influence as it adapts to a multipolar world order. article. Since the withdrawal from both theaters, Iraq is in a state of near-anarchy while the Taliban has succeeded in taking back territory in Afghanistan. Krauthammer was correct: the world was given a demonstration of American "ferocity" and its "full capacities" but was also shown the folly of over-optimistic nation-building and democratization strategies and an absence of will to stay until the job is done. The points gained by demonstrating overwhelming kinetic force were erased by failed strategies and weak resolve.
Krauthammer also contends that the United States' "recuperative power," or its resilience, after the 9/11 attacks also gave it much hegemonic capital -according to him, America's sense of invulnerability "was transmuted from impermeability to resilience, the product of unrivaled, human, technological and political reserves." 14 To assert that the United
States has somehow gained power in the international system because it was able to reopen the New York Stock Exchange six days after the 9/11 attacks is hyperbole and hubris more than a quantifiable measure of real power. Would the London, Toronto, or Tokyo Stock Exchanges been incapable of doing the same? This overestimation of self and underestimation of others has proven dangerous in both strategy and war and does not facilitate objective analysis.
In contrast to Kagan and Krauthammer' War II isolationism but that it refocuses its foreign policy more narrowly upon national interests.
In particular, he believes that America should focus on containing the establishment of a regional hegemon in Eurasia, proliferation should be controlled cooperatively and diplomatically instead of by preventive military action, and threats such as terrorism should be countered by focusing on defense while using offensive action very sparingly. 25 In his words, the United States must "set political and military priorities much more rigorously and subsidize the security of others much less generously." 26 The United States, according to Posen, must "pull back."
To support the "lean forward" argument, Brooks et al. highlight two main points that, upon closer examination, fail to hold up to critical analysis. First, they claim that very low defense spending of America's allies is an indicator of the pacifying function of deep engagement. However, it is the pacification of America's potential adversaries, not allies, which should be of primary concern. If one accepts that a large military presence near a potential adversary does provide stability, then should it matter what flag the "allied" forces fall under?
Their second argument contends that deep engagement was the ideal policy to counter, contain, and eventually defeat, the Soviets in the Cold War and should, therefore, continue to be relevant and effective under current geopolitical circumstances. The radical changes in the international security environment over the last 25 years make it hard to believe that a late 1940s grand strategy is not in any need of revision. 27 In general, arguments for deep engagement are based on disparaging retrenchment concepts rather than emphasizing the virtues of leaning forward.
Stephen Walt succinctly summarizes the faulty logic of the "lean forward" doctrine:
U.S. leaders can only sell deep engagement by convincing Americans that the nation's security will be fatally compromised if they do not get busy managing the entire globe. Because the United States is in fact quite secure from direct attack and/or conquest, the only way to do that is by ceaseless threat-mongering, as has been done in the United States ever since the Truman Doctrine, the first Committee on the Present Danger and the alarmist rhetoric of NSC-68. Unfortunately, threat-mongering requires people in the national security establishment to exaggerate U.S. interests more-or-less constantly and to conjure up half-baked ideas like the domino theory to keep people nervous. And once a country has talked itself into a properly paranoid frame of mind, it inevitably stumbles into various quagmires, as the United States did in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Again, such debacles are not deviations from 'deep engagement'; they are a nearly inevitable consequence of it.
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President Barack Obama's failed attempts to retrench the degree to which he intended in his campaign promises demonstrates how difficult it is to pull back after decades of leaning forward.
However, there are powerful structural forces that are conspiring to drive a foreign policy course correction.
It is probable the United States will continue to emphasize an idealistic value based approach to world affairs; but, in the coming years it will be forced to do so in a more physically from Afghanistan, the Taliban commenced a revival campaign, and there is a risk Kabul will once again be subjugated to rule under its despotic regime. According to Huntington, these outcomes show "American leaders repeatedly make threats, promise action, and fail to deliver.
The result is a foreign policy of 'rhetoric and retreat' and a growing reputation as a 'hollow hegemon. '" 36 As the world marches slowly toward multipolarity, the United States will need to begin a process of gradual retrenchment to preserve, for as long as possible, its privileged hegemony while at the same time socializing the norms required for effective membership in the future world order. America's tendency to prioritize foreign over domestic policies should be reversed, democratization and nation-building should be doggedly avoided, national interests should be defined and applied more narrowly, soft power should be revived, and diplomacy renewed.
Finally, as the United States pulls back, it should empower partner nations to share the burden of preserving international stability in both indirect and direct ways.
For the last decade and a half, the United States was unable to focus adequately on domestic policies as a result of ambitious and costly democratization and nation-building endeavors. The current administration has attempted to reverse this trend recognizing the gravity of the existing economic decline and domestic malaise. In President Obama's words, "it is time to focus on nation-building here at home." 37 The economic factors already described as forces for a foreign policy course correction only scratch the surface of the myriad domestic maladies that should be targeted. However, to do so will require political cooperation and compromise, which have been conspicuously absent in Washington lately. More importantly, it will require money which will only be available if discipline and restraint are exercised to avoid costly and unproductive military adventures.
On September 11, 2001 America's path to overreach was drastically accelerated because vitriolic emotion and retributive motives replaced pragmatic grand strategy deliberations. After this date, counterterrorism became the singular focus amongst the political elite and the Bush Administration erroneously extended the United States' strategic perimeter to encompass the entire globe. 38 The death and destruction caused by the 9/11 attacks were on a massive scale but, in general, terrorism has never been, and never will be, an existential threat to the United States.
9/11 identified the seams and gaps in American defenses and intelligence sharing that will forever be sealed, but the elimination of "safe havens" through democratization and nationbuilding has been woefully ineffective and exorbitantly expensive. 39 Americans are more likely to be killed by a plethora of domestic threats (police, car accidents, and poverty to name just three) than they are as a result of terrorism. According to Walton, the United States must "move beyond the myopic grand strategy of the past decade, instead adopting one that is focused mainly on the future of the international system and, particularly, the relationship among the great powers."
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The United States must begin to accept that keeping the military instrument of power sheathed, when national security is not directly threatened, may be the best course of action. At times, it is better to be a "paper tiger" than it is to be a "hollow hegemon" and Washington must be prepared to ignore the rhetoric from nations who will criticize restraint as much as they do overreach. When it acts militarily, the United States must ensure that end-states are welldefined, achievable, and ultimately realized or it should not act at all -a self-evident statement since no administration commits forces expecting anything but victory; but overconfidence and excessive optimism have plagued American asymmetric wars for decades with no sign of correction. It is unrealistic to expect that foreign policy will ever be divorced from domestic politics; thus, if not acting is a sign of domestic political weakness and acting but failing is a sign of international strategic incompetence then Washington must pick its poison wisely or suffer the consequences.
If hard power is to be used less over time then it follows that soft power must be cultivated and diplomacy renewed. The two concepts are inextricably linked with soft power dissolving enmity and diplomacy resolving it. If soft power is, as former President Bill Clinton eloquently stated, the power of America's example, it must derive from within -yet another reason for a "rebalance" to the domestic front. In contrast to current practices, diplomacy and negotiations should lead to the carrot rather than masquerade as one. As Yitzhak Rabin wisely stated while shaking hands with Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn in 1993, "you don't need to talk to make peace with your friends. You need to make peace with your enemies." 41 If peace is elusive, then the United States must work cooperatively within alliances or multilaterally in order to achieve international solutions to international problems.
With respect to hard power, the United States cannot underwrite global security indefinitely. In order to wean itself from this incredible burden, it must encourage and empower its allies to assume more responsibility. Accordingly, the United States should take the following actions: encourage countries to spend more on defense and take ownership of their regional deterrence; and empower partners by executing multinational operations with greater humility and inclusiveness. confront the corrosion of their polity's influence and are apt to find alluring flattering humbug that emphasizes national 'specialness' and offhandedly dismisses decline." 49 However, in reality the "unipolar moment" was just that -a moment in time that has come and gone. The United
States is in relative decline in a world where power is becoming more and more diffuse. The macroeconomic and geopolitical conditions that exist today are ill-suited to an "in your face" deep engagement foreign policy.
Regardless of one's position on the isolation-neoconservative spectrum, Washington will be compelled to exercise a degree of restraint in the future so that it can focus on the domestic economy, satisfy a war-wary electorate, correct the folly of global democratization, and sequester the costs of nation-building. Such a course correction will be difficult after decades of deep engagement, but according to Thucydides, "of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men the most." 50 With a restrained foreign policy, the United States must define its national interests more narrowly and avoid the temptation to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Militarily, the Pentagon should conduct a measured withdrawal of forces from Europe to encourage allies to spend more on defense and reduce partner dependence on the American security umbrella. The Pentagon should also empower partner nations by treating them as "mutually indispensable" -give them instrumental roles and responsibilities from planning to leading operations. According to Winston Churchill, "there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them!" 51 If the United States adopts even some of the recommendations found herein, it will effectively manage its decline and lay the foundation for a preeminent role in the future international system -whatever form it takes. If it does not make the prescribed course corrections, growing domestic and economic malaise will have deleterious effects on America's ability to influence in a multipolar world. Walton astutely points out, "There is an immense qualitative difference between managed relative decline and an unregulated, chaotic freefall."
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The United States must act now to avoid the "freefall" -there is no such thing as a grand strategy parachute.
Notes

